Applying Distinction Between Examples and Timeless Principles
The ability to distinguish between specific examples and timeless principles is a crucial aspect of biblical interpretation and theological reasoning. This distinction allows for the application of scriptural teachings to diverse contexts while maintaining fidelity to their core message.
In practical reason, as articulated by Aquinas, there is a process of moving from naturally known, indemonstrable principles to specific conclusions [4]. This mirrors the way one might approach biblical texts: identifying underlying principles that transcend the immediate historical or cultural setting of an example. For instance, when considering the qualifications for deacons in 1 Timothy 3:10, the instruction to "be proved" involves a "searching inquiry" to determine if they are "blameless" [2]. While the specific method of inquiry might vary, the timeless principle is the necessity of vetting character and conduct for those in leadership roles.
The concept of discerning between different things is also highlighted in Philippians 1:10, which encourages believers to "approve things that are excellent" or "try things that differ" [1]. This implies a need to evaluate and distinguish between various doctrines, practices, and values, recognizing that some are more aligned with divine truth than others. This discernment is not merely about identifying what is good, but what is excellent or best among differing options [1].
Theological discourse often grapples with this distinction when discussing concepts like species in biology, as seen in Charles Hodge's Systematic Theology. one tradition notes that while there can be diversity of "external or material character," this does not necessarily indicate a diversity of species if the "immaterial principle" or "design, plan, and intention" remains the same [3, 6]. Similarly, in theological application, specific biblical examples might represent a broader, unchanging divine principle. Hodge also discusses how the terms "present" and "absent" can be ambiguous when distinguishing between knowledge and faith, suggesting that the core difference lies not in the object's presence but in the nature of conviction [5]. This illustrates the need to look beyond superficial distinctions to the underlying essence of a concept.
Sources
- Philippians (Baptist/Reformed) “John Gill on Philippians 1:10: That ye may approve things that are excellent,.... Or "try things that differ". There are some things that differ one from other; as morality and grace, earthly things, and heavenly things, carnal and spiritual, temporal and eternal things, law and Gospel, the doctrines of men, and the doctrines of Christ; all which differ as much as chaff and wheat, as gold, silver, precious stones, and wood, hay, stubble. These are to be tried and proved; they are not to be received without distinction, but should be examined, which is right and best to be chosen and preferred;”
- 1 Timothy (Presbyterian) “Jamieson, Fausset & Brown on 1 Timothy 3:10: "And moreover," &c. [ALFORD]. be proved--not by a period of probation, but by a searching inquiry, conducted by Timothy, the ordaining president (Ti1 5:22), whether they be "blameless"; then when found so, "let them act as deacons." blameless--Greek, "unexceptionable"; as the result of public investigation unaccused [TITTMANN].”
- CCEL (Reformed (Old Princeton)) “Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, Vol. 2, section 18: in what is immaterial. So that where the immaterial principle of Agassiz, or the potential idea of Dana, is the same, the species is the same; where the immaterial principle is different, the species is different. 101 De la Longevitè Humaine, etc., par P. Flourens, Paris, 1855. 102 Principles of zoölogy, p. XIV. 103 Principles of zoölogy, p. 9. 104 Ibid. p 43. 105 Bibliotheca Sacra, 1857. p. 863. 106 Bibliotheca Sacra, 1857, p. 861.”
- theology (Catholic (Scholastic)) “Aquinas, Summa Theologica, First Part of the Second Part (Prima Secundae), Of the Various Kinds of Law, Art. 3: Article: Whether there is a human law? I answer that, As stated above (Question [90], Article [1], ad 2), a law is a dictate of the practical reason. Now it is to be observed that the same procedure takes place in the practical and in the speculative reason: for each proceeds from principles to conclusions, as stated above (De Lib. Arb. i, 6). Accordingly we conclude that just as, in the speculative reason, from naturally known indemonstrable principles, we draw the conclusions of th”
- CCEL (Reformed (Old Princeton)) “Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, Vol. 3, section 10: is involved in the first. The terms present and absent are not only ambiguous in this connection, but it is not true, as just stated, that an object must be absent in order to be an object of faith. The differentia , in other words, between knowledge and faith, is not found in the presence or absence of their objects. We can know what is absent, and we can believe what is present. The third objection is, that the conviction we have of the reality or truth of what we distinctly remember is knowledge, and not distinctively faith, unless we ”
- CCEL (Reformed (Old Princeton)) “Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, Vol. 2, section 19: perpetuated; as is seen in the different breeds of horses, cattle, and sheep found even in so restricted a field of operation as Great Britain. It is certain, therefore, that no diversity of an external or material character, not indicative of diversity of design, plan, and intention can properly be assumed as indicative of diversity of species. The presence of a skin connecting the toes or claws of a bird, is in itself a comparatively small affair. It is insignificant as to the amount of material expended, and as to the effect on the gen”