Definition Of Hypostasis In Christian Theology
The Greek term ὑπόστασις (hypóstasis) literally means "a setting under" or "support" [1]. In theological contexts, it evolved to signify essence or substance, and later, a concrete individual existence or person [1, 6].
In early Christian thought, the term's usage was fluid, sometimes being used interchangeably with οὐσία (ousia), meaning "essence" [9]. Saint Jerome noted that "the whole school of secular learning understanding nothing else by hypostasis than usia, essence" [9]. However, a distinction gradually emerged, particularly in discussions concerning the Trinity and the person of Christ. Athanasius of Alexandria, for instance, used "three hypostases" to refer to the distinct persons of the Godhead, while also using hypostasis synonymously with ousia to signify the one Almighty God [9]. The Council of Sardica also contributed to the evolving understanding of the term [10].
In Trinitarian theology, hypostasis came to denote the distinct "persons" of the Godhead—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—while maintaining that they share one divine essence (ousia) [5]. John Calvin, for example, inferred from Scripture that there is a proper subsistence (hypostasis) of the Father, which shines in the Son, and a distinct subsistence of the Son that differentiates him from the Father. The same applies to the Holy Spirit, who also has a separate subsistence [5]. This distinction was crucial for articulating the doctrine of the Trinity, avoiding both modalism (one God appearing in different modes) and tritheism (three separate gods).
In Christology, hypostasis is central to understanding the "hypostatic union," which describes the union of the divine and human natures in the one person of Jesus Christ [11]. Thomas Aquinas explains that in Christ, there are two natures (divine and human) but only one hypostasis [2]. This means that while Christ possesses both a divine nature and a human nature, these two natures are united in a single individual subject or "suppositum" [2, 3, 6]. Aquinas further clarifies that being pertains to the hypostasis as "that which has being" and to the nature as "that whereby it has being" [2]. Therefore, attributes and actions, such as suffering, are ascribed to the one hypostasis or person of Christ, even though they may originate from one of his distinct natures [7, 12]. The sonship of Christ, for instance, belongs to his hypostasis or person, not to his nature [8]. Charles Hodge emphasizes that Christ is a "true or real man" with a human substance, and also possesses a "truly divine nature" with the substance of God [4].
Sources
- Strong's Greek Dictionary “[G5287] ὑπόστασις (hypóstasis) — Definition: a setting under (support), i.e. (figuratively) concretely, essence, or abstractly, assurance (objectively or subjectively) | Derivation: from a compound of G5259 (ὑπό) and G2476 (ἵστημι); | KJV usage: confidence, confident, person, substance”
- theology (Catholic (Scholastic)) “Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Third Part (Tertia Pars), Of Christ's Unity of Being, Art. 2: Article: Whether there is only one being in Christ? I answer that, Because in Christ there are two natures and one hypostasis, it follows that things belonging to the nature in Christ must be two; and that those belonging to the hypostasis in Christ must be only one. Now being pertains both to the nature and to the hypostasis; to the hypostasis as to that which has being---and to the nature as to that whereby it has being. For nature is taken after the manner of a form, which is said to be a being because ”
- theology (Catholic (Scholastic)) “Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Third Part (Tertia Pars), Of the Mode of Union of the Word Incarnate, Art. 3: Article: Whether the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the suppositum or hypostasis? I answer that, Some who did not know the relation of hypostasis to person, although granting that there is but one person in Christ, held, nevertheless, that there is one hypostasis of God and another of man, and hence that the union took place in the person and not in the hypostasis. Now this, for three reasons, is clearly erroneous. First, because person only adds to hypostasis a determinate natur”
- CCEL (Reformed (Old Princeton)) “Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, Vol. 2, section 79: sorrowful, that increased in wisdom and was ignorant of certain things, God intends and requires that we should believe that He was a true man, — not a phantom, not an abstraction, — not the complex of properties without the substance of humanity, but a true or real man, like other men, yet without sin. In like manner when He is declared to be God over all, to be omniscient, almighty, and eternal, it is no less evident that He has a truly divine nature; that the substance of God in Him is the subject in which these divine attributes inher”
- CCEL (Reformed) “John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, section 29: what is immediately added—viz. that he is “the brightness of his glory.” The fair inference from the Apostle’s words is, that there is a proper subsistence (hypostasis) of the Father, which shines refulgent in the Son. From this, again it is easy to infer that there is a subsistence (hypostasis) of the Son which distinguishes him from the Father. The same holds in the case of the Holy Spirit; for we will immediately prove both that he is God, and that he has a separate subsistence from the Father. This, moreover, is not a distincti”
- theology (Catholic (Scholastic)) “Aquinas, Summa Theologica, First Part (Prima Pars), The Divine Persons, Art. 2: Article: Whether "person" is the same as hypostasis, subsistence, and essence? I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), substance is twofold. In one sense it means the quiddity of a thing, signified by its definition, and thus we say that the definition means the substance of a thing; in which sense substance is called by the Greeks {ousia}, what we may call "essence." In another sense substance means a subject or "suppositum," which subsists in the genus of substance. To this, taken in a general se”
- theology (Catholic (Scholastic)) “Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Third Part (Tertia Pars), Of Christ's Subjection to the Father, Art. 2: Article: Whether Christ is subject to Himself? I answer that, As was said above (Article [1], ad 2), to be master or servant is attributed to a person or hypostasis according to a nature. Hence when it is said that Christ is the master or servant of Himself, or that the Word of God is the Master of the Man Christ, this may be understood in two ways. First, so that this is understood to be said by reason of another hypostasis or person, as if there was the person of the Word of God ruling and the ”
- theology (Catholic (Scholastic)) “Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Third Part (Tertia Pars), Of Adoption as Befitting to Christ, Art. 4: Article: Whether Christ as man is the adopted Son of God? I answer that, Sonship belongs properly to the hypostasis or person, not to the nature; whence in the FP, Question [32], Article [3] we have stated that Filiation is a personal property. Now in Christ there is no other than the uncreated person or hypostasis, to Whom it belongs by nature to be the Son. But it has been said above (Article [1], ad 2), that the sonship of adoption is a participated likeness of natural sonship: nor can a thing b”
- CCEL (Patristic) “Athanasius of Alexandria, Select Works and Letters, section 161: οὐσία denotes, when Athanasius says, “three hypostases,” he takes the word to mean οὐσία in that particular sense in which it is three, and when he makes it synonymous with οὐσία , he uses it to signify Almighty God in that sense in which He is one. Leaving Athanasius, we have the following evidence concerning the history of the word ὑπόστασις . S. Jerome says, “The whole school of secular learning understanding nothing else by hypostasis than usia, essence,” Ep . xv. 4, where, speaking of the Three Hypostases he uses the strong ”
- CCEL (Patristic) “Athanasius of Alexandria, Select Works and Letters, section 161: against the supposed discrimination of the two terms by the Council of Nicæa. Bull can only meet it by considering that an innovation upon the “veterem vocabuli usum” began at the date of the Council of Sardica, though Socrates mentions the dispute as existing at Alexandria before the Nicene Council, H. E. iii. 4. 5. while the supposititious confession of Sardica professes to have received the doctrine of the one hypostasis by tradition as Catholic. Nor is the use of the word in earlier times inconsistent with these testimonies; ”
- CCEL (Reformed (Old Princeton)) “Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, Vol. 2, section 130: doctrine of the hypostatical union as given by the Lutheran divines. Thus Gerhard 477 477 Loci Theologici, IV. vli. 121; edit. Tubingen, 1764, vol. iii. p. 428. says, “ Neque enim pars parti, sed totus λόγος toti carni et tota caro toti λόγῳ est unita; ideo propter ὑποστάσεως ταυτότητα καὶ τῶν φυσέων περιχώρησιν, λόγος ita præsens est carni et caro ita præsens est τῷ λόγῳ , ut nec λόγος sit extra carnem nec caro extra λόγον , sed ubicunque est λόγος , ibi etiam præsentissimam sibi habet carnem, quippe quam in personæ unitatem assumsit: e”
- theology (Catholic (Scholastic)) “Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Third Part (Tertia Pars), The Passion of Christ, Art. 12: Article: Whether Christ's Passion is to be attributed to His Godhead? I answer that, As stated above (Question [2], Articles [1],2,3,6), the union of the human nature with the Divine was effected in the Person, in the hypostasis, in the suppositum, yet observing the distinction of natures; so that it is the same Person and hypostasis of the Divine and human natures, while each nature retains that which is proper to it. And therefore, as stated above (Question [16], Article [4]), the Passion is to be attributed”