Mentorship and Authority in Decision-Making Processes
In Christian thought, the interplay between mentorship and authority in decision-making processes often involves discerning the role of human counsel alongside divine guidance and individual responsibility. Augustine, for instance, noted that in the order of nature, authority often precedes reasoning when learning something new, especially because human minds can be "obscured by familiarity with darkness" [9]. This suggests that external authority can be a necessary guide when an individual's own reasoning is compromised or undeveloped.
The concept of authority can be understood in different ways. Tertullian distinguishes between counsel, which is proposed to the will for acceptance or rejection, and authority, which "descends from authority, and is bound to necessity" [4]. Disregarding counsel might be seen as an exercise of liberty, while disregarding authority could be considered contumacy [4]. This highlights a tension between individual freedom in decision-making and the binding nature of certain authoritative pronouncements.
In the context of moral decision-making, the mind's authority plays a crucial role. Tertullian also describes how, when an enticement to desire arises, "nothing is accomplished until the assent of the soul is gained, and the authority of the mind has granted indulgence to the wicked suggestion" [5]. This internal process involves the "judgment of reason" making a decree after considering various factors [5].
Mentorship, or counsel, is seen as a source of "sound wisdom" and strength [12]. The apostle Paul, in his preaching, relied not on "enticing words of man's wisdom" but on the "demonstration of the Spirit and of power," indicating that divine authority and spiritual guidance supersede human persuasive techniques [11]. This suggests that while human counsel is valuable, ultimate authority in spiritual matters rests with God.
The Scholastic tradition, exemplified by Aquinas, discusses authority in terms of judgment and the power to act. In the context of "the power of the keys," two things are necessary for someone performing an act: "judgment of the fitness of the recipient, and accomplishment of the act" [1]. This implies that authority involves both discernment and the capacity to execute a decision.
Reformed theology, as articulated by Charles Hodge, emphasizes human free agency and responsibility for actions, even those preceding deliberation [3, 7]. While acknowledging that humans are free agents, Hodge also notes that the nature of free agency is a point of contention, with some identifying certainty with necessity, which can lead to confusion [2, 6, 10]. He clarifies that free agency involves both reason and active power [7]. The "mystical method," which prioritizes feeling over reason, is viewed with caution, as it distrusts reason in favor of feelings in the sphere of religion [8]. This underscores the importance of reasoned judgment, potentially guided by mentors, in decision-making processes.
Sources
- theology (Catholic (Scholastic)) “Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Supplement (Supplementum), Of the Power of the Keys, Art. 3: Article: Whether there are two keys or only one? I answer that, Whenever an act requires fitness on the part of the recipient, two things are necessary in the one who has to perform the act, viz. judgment of the fitness of the recipient, and accomplishment of the act. Therefore in the act of justice whereby a man is given what he deserves, there needs to be a judgment in order to discern whether he deserves to receive. Again, an authority or power is necessary for both these things, for we cannot give save ”
- CCEL (Reformed (Old Princeton)) “Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, Vol. 2, section 55: establish fatalism throughout the universe. When it is proved that, through all nature, the same consequences invariably result from the same circumstances, the doctrine of liberty must be given up.” 265 265 It may be well to remark, in passing, how uniformly writers of the school to which Reid belongs, identify certainty and necessity, so long as they argue against an opponent. In the passage above quoted, it is not that the will is determined by necessity, or by a cause out of the mind, but simply that the same decisions “invariably” oc”
- CCEL (Reformed (Old Princeton)) “Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, Vol. 2, section 28: we examine our own consciousness as to the judgment which we pass upon ourselves, we shall find that we hold ourselves responsible not only for the deliberate acts of the will, that is, for acts of deliberate self-determination, which suppose both knowledge and volition, but also for emotional, impulsive acts, which precede all deliberation; and not only for such impulsive acts, but also for the principles, dispositions, or immanent states of the mind, by which its acts whether impulsive or deliberate, are determined. When a man is convin”
- Schaff ANF/NPNF (Patristic) “ANF Vol 4: Tertullian IV, Minucius Felix, Commodian, Origen — CHAP. I.--REASONS WHICH LED TO THE WRITING OF THIS SECOND BOOK. (part 2): in that the former springs from counsel, and is proposed to the will (for acceptance or rejection): the other descends from authority, and is bound to necessity. In the former case, to disregard appears liberty, in the latter, contumacy.”
- Schaff ANF/NPNF (Patristic) “ANF Vol 4: Tertullian IV, Minucius Felix, Commodian, Origen — FROM THE LATIN. (part 1): mind, unless he has discovered already, that when an enticement to any desire arises, nothing is accomplished until the assent of the soul is gained, and the authority of the mind has granted indulgence to the wicked suggestion; so that a claim might seem to be made by two parties on certain probable grounds as to a judge residing within the tribunals of our hurt, in order that, after the statement of reasons, the decree of execution may proceed from the judgment of reason.[2] For, to take an illustration: ”
- CCEL (Reformed (Old Princeton)) “Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, Vol. 2, section 55: the very opposite of liberty, and yet they are said to be identical. One man in asserting the freedom of the will, means to assert free agency, while he denies ability; another means by it full ability. It is certainly important that the same words should not be used to express antagonistic ideas. Confusion of thought and language, however, is not the principal evil which arises from making liberty and ability identical. It necessarily brings us into conflict with the truth, and with the moral judgments of men. There are three truths of w”
- CCEL (Reformed (Old Princeton)) “Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, Vol. 2, section 56: well before proceeding further, to state the points as to which the parties to this controversy are agreed. 1. They are agreed that man is a free agent, in such a sense as to be responsible for his character and acts. The dispute is not about the fact, but the nature of free agency. If any one denied that men are responsible moral agents, then he belongs to the school of necessity, and is not a party to the discussion now under consideration. 2. It is agreed as to the nature of free agency that it supposes both reason and active power. Me”
- CCEL (Reformed (Old Princeton)) “Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, Vol. 1, section 7: § 4. The Mystical Method . Few words have been used with greater latitude of meaning than mysticism. It is here to be taken in a sense antithetical to speculation. Speculation is a process of thought; mysticism is matter of feeling. The one assumes that the thinking faculty is that by which we attain the knowledge of truth. The other, distrusting reason, teaches that the feelings alone are to be relied upon, at least in the sphere of religion. Although this method has been unduly pressed, and systems of theology have been constructed under”
- Schaff ANF/NPNF (Patristic) “NPNF1 Vol 4: Augustine — Anti-Manichaean, Anti-Donatist — CHAP. 2.--HE BEGINS WITH ARGUMENTS, IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE MISTAKEN METHOD OF THE MANICHAEANS.: 3. Where, then, shall I begin ? With authority, or with reasoning ? In the order of nature, when we learn anything, authority precedes reasoning. For a reason may seem weak, when, after it is given, it requires authority to confirm it. But because the minds of men are obscured by familiarity with darkness, which covers them in the night of sins and evil habits, and cannot perceive in a way suitable to the clearness and purity of reason, there”
- CCEL (Reformed (Old Princeton)) “Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, Vol. 2, section 55: Macht aus sich zu werden.” p. 62. 265 It may be well to remark, in passing, how uniformly writers of the school to which Reid belongs, identify certainty and necessity, so long as they argue against an opponent. In the passage above quoted, it is not that the will is determined by necessity, or by a cause out of the mind, but simply that the same decisions “invariably” occur in the same circumstances, that is declared to be fatalism. 266 Tappan’s Review of Edwards, edit. New York, 1839, p. 223. 267 Active Powers, Essay v. ch. 2; Works, Ed”
- 1 Corinthians (Presbyterian) “Jamieson, Fausset & Brown on 1 Corinthians 2:4: my speech--in private. preaching--in public [BENGEL]. ALFORD explains it, My discourse on doctrines, and my preaching or announcement of facts. enticing--rather, "persuasive." man's wisdom--man's is omitted in the oldest authorities. Still "wisdom" does refer to "man's" wisdom. in demonstration of . . . Spirit, &c.--Persuasion is man's means of moving his fellow man. God's means is demonstration, leaving no doubt, and inspiring implicit faith, by the powerful working of the Spirit (then exhibited both outwardly by miracles, and inwardly b”
- Proverbs (Presbyterian) “Jamieson, Fausset & Brown on Proverbs 8:14: It also gives the elements of good character in counsel. sound wisdom-- (Pro 2:7). I . . . strength--or, "As for me, understanding is strength to me," the source of power (Ecc 9:16); good judgment gives more efficiency to actions;”