Tozer's View on Voluntary Choice and Moral Acts

A.W. Tozer, a prominent Christian pastor and theologian, emphasized the importance of understanding the nature of voluntary choice and moral acts. Although Tozer's specific views are not directly cited in the available sources, the Reformed tradition, to which he belonged, provides insight into the concept of voluntary choice and its relation to moral acts. According to Charles Hodge, a key figure in the Reformed (Old Princeton) tradition, a volition is "a preference resulting in a decision" ^[1]. This understanding is crucial in assessing the moral character of human actions.

The Reformed tradition, as represented by Hodge, posits that the moral character of dispositions or habits depends on their nature, not their origin ^[2]. This perspective is significant in understanding Tozer's likely stance on voluntary choice and moral acts, as it underscores the importance of the inherent quality of actions rather than their source. In contrast, the Pelagian and Rationalistic doctrines suggest that moral character is determined by the use of reason and free will, implying that individuals are neither righteous nor unrighteous by creation but become so through their actions ^[9].

The concept of voluntary action is also explored in the context of Eastern Orthodox thought by John of Damascus, who defines a voluntary act as one "of which the beginning or cause originates in an actor, who knows each individual circumstance" ^[3]. This definition aligns with the Reformed perspective in emphasizing the role of knowledge and intention in voluntary actions. The Catholic (Scholastic) tradition, as represented by Aquinas, further nuances the understanding of moral acts by highlighting the significance of the end or object of an action in determining its moral species ^[6].

The Patristic tradition, as seen in the writings of Clement of Alexandria, distinguishes between different kinds of voluntary actions, including those by desire, choice, or intention, and recognizes that sinning often arises from an inability to determine what ought to be done ^[5]. This nuanced understanding of voluntary actions and their moral implications is relevant to Tozer's views, as it reflects a broader Christian theological concern with the nature of moral responsibility.

In the Reformed tradition, the change of moral preference or regeneration is seen as involving a complex process that includes the consideration and comparison of different objects as the chief good, a process that is not solely the result of previous preferences but is influenced by the Holy Spirit ^{[4, 7]}. This understanding underscores the interplay between human decision-making and divine agency in moral transformation.

The emphasis on the role of intention and choice in moral acts is a common thread across these traditions. According to Hodge, "if any outward action or state of the feeling exists, in opposition to the intention or choice of the mind, it cannot by any possibility have moral character" ^[8]. This highlights the centrality of voluntary choice in determining the moral quality of actions, a perspective that likely informs Tozer's views on the subject.

The theological traditions represented in the sources converge on the importance of understanding voluntary choice and its relation to moral acts, though they may diverge on specific aspects such as the origin of moral character and the role of divine agency. Tozer's Reformed background suggests that his view on voluntary choice and moral acts would emphasize the significance of the inherent nature of actions and the role of divine influence in shaping moral preferences.

The historical and theological context provided by these sources illuminates the complexities of Tozer's likely perspective on voluntary choice and moral acts, underscoring the multifaceted nature of Christian theological thought on this topic. The nuanced discussions across different Christian traditions highlight the ongoing relevance of these concepts to Christian ethics and moral theology.

Sources

CCEL (Reformed (Old Princeton)) “Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, Vol. 2, section 56: of the term. This is only saying, that a man cannot prefer against his preference or choose against his choice. A volition is a preference resulting in a decision. A man may have one preference at one time and another at another. He may have various conflicting feelings or principles in action at the same time; but he cannot have coëxisting opposite preferences. What consciousness teaches on this subject seems to be simply this: that in every voluntary act we had some reason for acting as we did; that in the absence of that reason, or in ”
CCEL (Reformed (Old Princeton)) “Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, Vol. 2, section 28: on their Origin. The second great principle involved in the Scriptural doctrine on this subject is, that the moral character of dispositions or habits depends on their nature and not on their origin. There are some who endeavour to take a middle ground between the rationalistic and the evangelical doctrines. They admit that moral character may be predicated of dispositions as distinguished from voluntary acts, but they insist that this can only be done when such dispositions have been self-acquired. They acknowledge that the frequent repe”
CCEL (Eastern Orthodox) “John of Damascus, An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith, section 39: while shooting at the customary range one slew one’s father who happened to be passing by, this would be termed an ignorant and involuntary act. As, then, that which is involuntary is in two parts, one depending on force, the other on ignorance, that which is voluntary is the opposite of both. For that which is voluntary is the result neither of force nor of ignorance 1871 1871 Ibid. , ch. 32. . A voluntary act, then, is one of which the beginning or cause originates in an actor, who knows each individual circumstance thr”
CCEL (Reformed (Old Princeton)) “Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, Vol. 3, section 5: or the other as his chief good. While this must be the process by which a moral being forms his first moral preference, substantially the same process is indispensable to a change of this preference. The change involves the preference of a new object as the chief good; a preference which the former preference has no tendency to produce, but a direct tendency to prevent; a preference, therefore, not resulting from, or in any way occasioned by a previous preference of any given object, but resulting from those acts of considering and compari”
Schaff ANF/NPNF (Patristic) “ANF Vol 2: Hermas, Tatian, Theophilus, Athenagoras, Clement of Alexandria — CHAP. XV.--ON THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF VOLUNTARY ACTIONS, AND THE SINS THENCE PROCEEDING. (part 1): What is voluntary is either what is by desire, or what is by choice, or what is of intention. Closely allied to each other are these things--sin, mistake, crime. It is sin, for example, to live luxuriously and licentiously; a misfortune, to wound one's friend in ignorance, taking him for an enemy; and crime, to violate graves or 362 commit sacrilege. Sinning arises from being unable to determine what ought to be done, or b”
theology (Catholic (Scholastic)) “Aquinas, Summa Theologica, First Part of the Second Part (Prima Secundae), Of the Good and Evil of Human Acts, in General, Art. 6: Article: Whether an action has the species of good or evil from its end? I answer that, Certain actions are called human, inasmuch as they are voluntary, as stated above (Question [1], Article [1]). Now, in a voluntary action, there is a twofold action, viz. the interior action of the will, and the external action: and each of these actions has its object. The end is properly the object of the interior act of the will: while the object of the external action, is th”
CCEL (Reformed (Old Princeton)) “Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, Vol. 3, section 5: which ought to determine the sinner to make choice of God, will remain without saving effect, unless the Spirit renders them effectual. These views are presented at length in the “Christian Spectator” (a quarterly review) for 1829. On the nature of the change in question, Dr. Taylor says: “Regeneration, considered as a moral change of which man is the subject — giving God the heart — making a new heart — loving God supremely, etc., are terms and phrases which, in popular use, denote a complex act. . . . These words, in all ordinary speech ”
CCEL (Reformed (Old Princeton)) “Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, Vol. 3, section 5: bad. “If any outward action or state of the feeling exists, in opposition to the intention or choice of the mind, it cannot by any possibility have moral character. Whatever is beyond the control of a moral agent, he cannot be responsible for.” 23 23 Ibid. p. 164. “Love may, and often does exist, as every one knows, in the form of a mere feeling or emotion. . . . This emotion or feeling, as we are all aware, is purely an involuntary state of mind. Because it is a phenomenon of the sensibility, and of course a passive state of mind, it has ”
CCEL (Reformed (Old Princeton)) “Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, Vol. 2, section 28: § 6. Pelagian and Rationalistic Doctrine . According to Pelagians and Rationalists man was created a rational free agent, but without moral character. He was neither righteous nor unrighteous, holy nor unholy. He had simply the capacity of becoming either. Being endowed with reason and free will, his character depended upon the use which he made of those endowments. If he acted right, he became righteous; if he acted wrong, he became unrighteous. There can be, according to their system, no such thing as concreated moral character, and the”

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